Introduction
Aristotle thinks that if you want to live well, you should organize your life by reference to the best thing that humans can achieve in action-something he calls "the human good." In Nicomachean Ethics 1. 7, Aristotle helpfully defines the human good as "activity of the rational part of the soul on the basis of virtue and if there are more virtues than one, on the basis of the best and most end-like virtue and moreover in an end-like [i.e. complete] life" (1098a16-18) . This definition is the conclusion of what is known as "the ergon argument" (a.k.a. "the function argument"). In this essay, I aim to clear the way for a new interpretation of this argument, and I do so by questioning the ubiquitous assumption that the ergon of something is always the proper activity of that thing. I argue that though Aristotle has a single concept of an ergon, he identifies the ergon of any X (that has an ergon) as an activity in some cases but a product in others, depending on the sort of thing the X is-for while the ergon of the eye is seeing, the ergon of a sculptor is not sculpting but a sculpture. This alternative interpretation of Aristotle's concept of an ergon allows the key explanatory middle term of the ergon argument to be what, I argue, it ought to be: "the best achievement of a human." On my interpretation of the argument, Aristotle assumes that the human good is the best achievement of a human, and he uses the concept of an ergon in order to gain clarity on what this achievement might be. He reasons that just as the best achievement of a sculptor will be a version of his ergon, which is a sculpture, so the best achievement of a human will be a version of his ergon, which is a certain activity of living. On the basis of this recovered bit of reasoning I close by offering, and briefly discussing, a new reconstruction of the ergon argument.
"Ergon" in the Nicomachean Ethics 1. 7: Reasons for a Reassessment
In Nicomachean Ethics [NE] 1. 2, Aristotle introduces the phrase "the human good" to label what he has explained as the highest, and thus best, of all things achievable in action by humans. To be "best" (NE 1. 2, 1094a22) is to be most of all an end: an end that we desire for its own sake and not for the sake of something else, and one for the sake of which we choose everything else (1. 2, 1094a18-20) . Aristotle notes that while the many and the wise agree in naming the best good "eudaimonia" ("happiness"), they disagree over what exactly this is (1. 4, 1095a17-22) . After briefly considering and critiquing different accounts of what the best good is (1. 5-6), Aristotle gives his own account (1. 7) and he does so by means of an argument that pivots around the concept of an ergon. This is "the ergon argument."
In the lines just before the argument, Aristotle says that while people agree that eudaimonia is "the best <good>," we still need a clearer idea of what this best good is (1. 7, 1097b22-24) . He then suggests that we might attain this clarity if we grasp the ergon of a human. In what I will call "Section A" of the ergon argument, he explains why (cf. γάρ at 1097b24) doing so might be helpful: [Section A] This is because just as for a flautist, a sculptor, and every artisan, and generally, for whatever has an ergon and an action, the good, that is, the well [τὸ εὖ] seems to be <found> in its ergon, the same would seem to be so for a human, if he has an ergon. (NE 1. 7, 1097b25-28) 1 ὥσπερ γὰρ αὐλητῇ καὶ ἀγαλµατοποιῷ καὶ παντὶ τεχνίτῃ, καὶ ὅλως ὧν ἔστιν ἔργον τι καὶ πρᾶξις, ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ δοκεῖ τἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ τὸ εὖ, οὕτω δόξειεν ἂν καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, εἴπερ ἔστι τι ἔργον αὐτοῦ.
This passage supplies us with the fundamental principle upon which the ergon argument rests: For anything with an ergon and an action, "the good, that is, the well" is found in its ergon. I here translate "τὸ εὖ" as "the well," though (as I will later suggest) "τὸ εὖ" is better understood as "the excellent achievement." But I give this provisional, literal translation because our understanding of "τὸ εὖ" turns on our understanding of "ergon" since, as is clear from later in the argument, Aristotle uses "τὸ εὖ" to refer to a thing's ergon achieved well (1. 7, 1098a12).
"Ergon" in Section A has been translated as "function," 3 "characteristic activity," the basis of reason or not without reason" (1098a7-8) and the ergon of a kitharist is the performance on the kithara (1098a11-12). Second, while I have said that the claim of Section A is made with reference to "anything with an ergon and an action" (1097b26), some scholars take the Greek to mean "anything with an ergon, that is, an action." This would of course imply that the ergon of a thing is the same as its proper "action." Third, because it is clear that "the well" (τὸ εὖ, 1097b27) of a human being is a doing well and that this is "in" the human ergon, which is an activity, scholars assume that "the well" of every artisan is a doing well and that it must likewise be "in" their proper activities. We will return to these issues. But for now let us just note that on the basis of the broad scholarly agreement as well as these last considerations, one might draw the not illgrounded conclusion that Aristotle, in the NE ergon argument, understands the ergon of a thing to be the proper activity of that thing.
Yet there is reason to be uneasy. First, even if one assumes that Aristotle uses "ergon" to mean "proper activity" in NE 1. 7, one must also note that not long before (NE 1. 1, 1094a5) and not long after (NE 2. 6, 1106b10) the ergon argument Aristotle uses "ergon" in expressions that clearly refer to products. Aristotle would then appear to be switching back and forth between different meanings of the word "ergon" without any indication that he is doing so. Second, when Aristotle identifies the ergon of a productive artisan, he identifies it as a product, not a proper activity: for example, the ergon of shoemaker is a shoe and the ergon of a housebuilder is a house (NE 5 (=EE 4) . 5, 1133a7-10; cf. EE 2. 1, 1219a14-21). Third and most importantly, if ergon means "proper activity" in NE 1. 7, it is unclear how the claim of Section A is supposed to help Aristotle determine the human good, which he considers to be the best thing achievable by a human. Take the example of the sculptor. Even if "the good, that is, the well" of a sculptor consists in sculpting well, that seems irrelevant to the question of what the best thing achievable by a sculptor is-since this is presumably not sculpting but a sculpture.
These incongruities should give us pause, and because of them we should be open to reassessing the evidence for what Aristotle's concept of an ergon really is.
This essay consists in such a reassessment, and as I mentioned earlier, my
proposal will be that in NE 1. 7 (as elsewhere) Aristotle understands the ergon of an X to be an activity in some cases but a product in others, in accordance with the sort of thing the X is-for though Aristotle has a single concept of an ergon, he nevertheless identifies the ergon of the eye as seeing and the ergon of a sculptor as a sculpture. For ease of reference, I will call this the "alternative concept of an ergon." On my interpretation, the way Aristotle understands "the ergon of an X" is similar to the way he understands "the limit (πέρας) of an X." For though Aristotle has a single concept of a limit, he nevertheless identifies the limit of a plane as a line and the limit of a line as a point (cf.
Topics 4. 4, 141b19-22)-and Aristotle thinks a line (having one dimension) and a point (have zero dimensions) are radically different kinds of things. When Aristotle speaks of "the ergon of a human," that expression does refer to a proper activity, but "ergon" does not thereby mean what "proper activity" means. "Ergon" and "proper activity" express different concepts. Similarly, when Aristotle speaks of "the limit [πέρας] of a plane," that expression does refer to a line, but "limit" does not thereby mean what "line" (or "γραµµή") means. "Limit" and "line" express different concepts.
To argue for this interpretation, I examine passages from Plato's Republic, Aristotle's Protrepticus, Eudemian Ethics, De Caelo, and Nicomachean Ethics. Along the way we see that while Plato and Aristotle share the same basic concept of an ergon, they nevertheless differ in their accounts of what an ergon is. On Aristotle's account (though not on Plato's) the ergon of an X is the end for the sake of which an X, qua X, has being.
Plato's Understanding of an Ergon in the Republic
Plato gives an ergon argument in Republic 1 that scholars rightly take to be a precursor to the ergon argument of NE 1. 7. Reeve, Republic, ad loc. 15 These lines may startle a modern reader, for Plato appears to think that the ergon of a horse somehow consists in being used by man. On the basis of these lines Barney assumes that Plato's general notion of ergon is one of "instrumentality" ("Human Function", 299). I will not fully address this issue here, but we should note that Socrates considers this first account to be equivalent to his second account (353a9), in which the language of a user or instrument is absent. And so it is not obvious that Plato's concept of an ergon is inextricably tied to that of a "user," even if Plato (or Socrates) thinks that the ergon of a horse is essentially related it to a user. 16 (Oxford, 1993) , ad loc. Shorey and Bloom both translate ergon as "work" throughout the ergon argument, but their translation of the verbs that take "ergon" as their direct objects shows that they consider the ergon to be a function: for Shorey, "do" at 352e7 and "perform" at 353a11; and for Bloom, "do" both at 352e7 and 353a11. 18 In the Greek idiom the expression translated as "better than anything else" actually contains the word "best" (κάλλιστα), and so the notion of "best" is used in both accounts. 19 T. H. Irwin, Plato's Ethics (Oxford, 1995) , 179, emphasis added. I here mention a few more scholars who hold that Plato's concept of an ergon in the Republic is that of a function. G. Vlastos, "Justice and Happiness", in id., Platonic Studies (Princeton, 1973) , 111-139 at 115 writes: "the ἔργον of anything (of a tool, like a pruning-knife, or of a bodily organ, like an eye or an ear) is that activity which can be Despite this consensus, one should note that throughout the Republic Plato identifies the ergon of a productive art (e.g. the shoemaking-art or the housebuilding-art) not as its proper activity, but as its proper product. This occurs, for example, in the following passage, which comes shortly before Republic 1's ergon argument. To distinguish the art (τέχνη) of wage-earning from other arts Socrates explains:
This very benefit, receiving wages, doesn't result from <the artisan's> own art. On the contrary, if we are to examine the matter precisely, the doctoring-art makes health [ἡ µὲν ἰατρικὴ ὑγίειαν ποιεῖ], and the wage-earning-art a wage; the housebuilding-art makes a house, and the wageearning-art, which accompanies it, a wage, and the same [οὕτως] goes for all other arts: each achieves its ergon [τὸ αὑτῆς ἑκάστη ἔργον ἐργάζεται], and benefits that over which it is placed (Rep. 1, 346d1-6).
Socrates here remarks that the doctoring-art makes (ποιεῖ) health, the housebuilding-art a house, and the wage-earning-art a wage, and then places these examples in parallel structure with the following claim: "each <art> achieves [ἐργάζεται] its ergon." This indicates that we ought to read "ποιεῖ" as parallel to "ἐργάζεται;" and "health," "a house"
and "a wage" as parallel to "ergon." Consequently, Plato identifies the ergon of each of these particular arts not as their proper activities, but as their products. One should also note that Plato here speaks of each art achieving its ergon, and there is reason to think that not every art issues in a product. This is because later, in Republic X, Plato implies both that there is an art of flute-playing, and that the flute-player (in contrast to the flutemaker) does not make a product (601d1-e2). And so if the flute-player is to have an ergon, it will not be a product but an activity, his performance on the flute. If this is so, then when Plato speaks of each art achieving its ergon, he would seem to be assuming that while the ergon of the housebuilder is a product (a house), the ergon of the flute-'performed either exclusively by that thing or else more excellently [κάλλιστα] by it than by anything else' (353a)." Cooper, Human Good, 145 notes a claim common to both the NE and the Republic 1 ergon arguments: "a thing's excellence is the essential condition of its performing well its ergon." J. Annas, An Introduction to Plato's Republic (Oxford, 1981) , 54 writes: "Ergon is what a thing does qua a thing of that kind." R. Barney, "Socrates' Refutation of Thrasymachus", in G. Santas (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Plato's Republic (Malden, 2006) , 44-62 at 55, commenting on what she calls "the 'function' argument" writes, "the function of anything is 'that which one can do only with it or best with it ' (352e3-4, 353a9-11)." player is an activity (his performance). Other passages from the Republic suggest a similar picture.
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But is this the same notion of an ergon that occurs in Republic I's ergon argument? As far as examples of erga within Rep. I's ergon argument are concerned, nothing prevents it from being so. This is because even though the erga explicitly identified there are activities (e.g. seeing, hearing, living) these are the sorts of activities that do not issue in products. And so it is possible that Plato thinks that while the ergon of the eye is seeing and the ergon of the ear is hearing, the ergon of a housebuilder is still a house. As for textual indications that the same notion of an ergon is present in both places, here are three. First, it is only a few pages after the passage above that Plato gives his ergon argument, and in the meantime he gives no indication that his use of the word Reeve, trans.). But, as we have seen, ἀπεργάζοµαι and ποιέω do not always indicate a 20 Consider, for example, Rep. 4, 421d9-e5, which pretty clearly implies that the erga of potters are pots. In that passage, not only is the verb ἐργάζεται again paired with "erga" as its direct object at 421d12, just as it was in the ergon argument (I, 353c6-7; cf. 353a10-11) , but Socrates also speaks of "the erga of the arts" using the "ergon"-plus-genitive construction that, as we noted above, regularly signifies the ergon proper to a thing. Consider also the famous discussion of art in Rep. X, where Socrates clearly identifies the ergon of a couch-maker as a couch (not couchmaking), and again pairs the same verbs (ποιέω and ἐργάζοµαι) with the erga as their direct objects (for example, at 597a1-7 and 603a9-b3). Second, in the course of his argument in Rep. 10 he says that the ergon of the rational part of the soul is to deliberate (602d6-e2), echoing a similar claim made in the Rep. 1 ergon argument (cf. 353d3-7), and this strongly suggests that in Book 10 Plato assumes that while the ergon of a couchmaker is a product (a couch), the ergon of the rational part of the soul is an activity (to deliberate). 21 "ἔργον" in H. G. Liddell, R. Scott, and H. S. Jones, 9 th edn. with a revised supplement (Oxford, 1968) , 682-83 at §VI.1.a. "doing." Instead, just as the expression "ergon of X" (without changing its meaning) indicated an activity or a product in accordance with the sort of thing the X is, so each of the verbs in question (without changing their meaning) indicated a doing or a making as the case may be. Consequently, we lose the core meaning of these verbs when we translate them as "do" or "make." If we want to retain the core meaning, a few verbs in English may help: "accomplish," "achieve," "execute," etc. We can intelligibly speak of a statue as something that a sculptor has accomplished or achieved, and we can likewise speak of a flute-player's performance as something that the flute-player has accomplished or achieved. 22 Now in certain passages it may not be that important to retain the core meaning of the verbs in question, but in other passages it is important-and Plato's ergon argument is one of these passages. I recommend that we translate the two accounts this A bit later I will make some remarks about how best to translate "ergon." But for the moment, we need only to observe that Plato's two accounts should be translated along these lines if they are to reflect what I am suggesting are the contours of the concept of an ergon. Plato, I believe, is trying to give a single account of "the ergon of an X" that can nevertheless pick out different kinds of things (activities or products) just as one might
give a single account of "the limit of an X" that can nevertheless pick out different kinds of things (lines, points, etc.).
If we do understand Plato's accounts in this new way, we are put in a position to appreciate a difficulty-one that Aristotle appears to respond to in the Eudemian Ethics.
Notice that when Plato in each of his two accounts speaks about achieving something "best" ("κάλλιστα" or "ἄριστα") he understands "best" by reference to a comparison 22 Though this use of "achieve" may seem awkward, note that some languages have verbs that have semantic ranges that are quite similar to those (that I have just drawn attention to) of ποιέω or ἀπεργάζοµαι. Consider, for example, French "faire." One can say, "J'ai fait un gâteau" ("I made a cake") or "J'ai fait une promenade" ("I took a walk"). of several capacities, it is clear that when a thing can achieve several <things>, the best of these is always the ergon [ἀεὶ τούτων τὸ βέλτιστον <τὸ> ἔργον ἐστίν]: for example, health <is the ergon> of a doctor, and safety <is the ergon> of a sea-captain. Now we can name no better ergon of thought or the thinking part of the soul than truth. Truth, therefore, is the supreme ergon of the thinking part of the soul.
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There are complexities to this passage that I will not now address, but I think we can see here the same basic concept of an ergon that we detected in the Republic. (Göteborg, 1961) , but with some alterations to the translation. to claim that, if a thing can achieve only one thing, then that will be its ergon. But if a thing is naturally fit to achieve more than one thing, it is the best of these that is its ergon.
He then identifies the ergon of a doctor to be health and the ergon of a sea-captain to be safety; 26 yet he also identifies the ergon of the thinking part of the soul as "truth," earlier glossed by him as "thinking truly" (ἀληθεύειν). 27 Consequently, he understands the ergon of an X to be "the best" that an X, qua X, is fit to achieve, whether it be beyond its activity (as in the case of a doctor or sea-captain) or the activity itself (as in the case of the thinking-part of the soul).
In the Eudemian Ethics Aristotle goes into more detail about what he takes an ergon to be. Nevertheless, the Protrepticus account already differs from that of Plato. The reason is as follows. When Plato in the Republic speaks of the ergon of X as what X can alone achieve or what it can achieve best (ἄριστα and κάλλιστα), the notion of "best" is with respect to a comparison class of things that can achieve similar erga. But when
Aristotle in the Protrepticus speaks of the ergon of X as what is "best" (βέλτιστον), the notion of "best" is with respect to a comparison class of things that X, qua X, can achieve. This thought is developed in the EE.
Aristotle's Understanding of an Ergon in the Eudemian Ethics
Scholars generally agree that the Eudemian Ethics was written before the Nicomachean Ethics but after the Protrepticus. 28 In the EE ergon argument, we find what 26 Presumably, the many things that Aristotle thinks a doctor, for example, can achieve will be health but also healing, and all the various activities that form a part of healing (rubbing, purging, etc.) . 27 Since Aristotle first describes a case where something has only one capacity, the καὶ that links "most exact truth" and "thinking truly about what is" is epexegetic. This suggests that what is achieved is a certain true activity: thinking truly or judging truly. I take this interpretation to dovetail with the remarks we find in NE 6. 2, where we read that the ergon of the thinking parts of the soul is truth and that the virtues of these parts are what enable it to think most truly (μάλιστα ἀληθεύσει, 1039b13). Though I cannot here argue for this view, I think that Aristotle does not conceive of truth, in its primary sense, as something that lies outside the activity of thinking (cf. Metaphysics E 4, 1027b25-27). For a different view, see P. Crivelli, Aristotle on Truth (Cambridge, 2004) who maintains that true and false things (πράγµατα) "contribute to explaining what it is to be true or false for thoughts and sentences" (7 is probably the clearest case of Aristotle affirming that the ergon of an X is an activity in some cases and a product in others in accordance with the sort of thing the X is. The crucial passage runs:
It is clear that the ergon is better than the state or the disposition; but ergon is said in two ways
[λέγεται διχῶς]. In some cases, there is an ergon beyond the employment: 29 for example, a house is the ergon of the housebuilding-art and not the activity of housebuilding, and health is the ergon of the doctoring-art and not the activity of healing or doctoring. In other cases, the employment is the ergon: for example, seeing is the ergon of vision, and active understanding <of mathematical truth> is the ergon of mathematical knowledge. And so it follows that, when a thing's employment is its ergon, the employment is better than the state (EE 2. 1, 1219a11-18).
This passage is rarely discussed. However, Reeve briefly gives what would presumably be a preferred interpretation for those who advocate the ergon-as-function reading of NE 1. 7. Reeve suggests that Aristotle is here noting that the term "ergon" is "act/result ambiguous."
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This seems to me highly doubtful. For if Aristotle were noting that "ergon" is act/result ambiguous, he could have easily done so by saying that there is one sense in which a house is the ergon of the housebuilding-art and another sense in which housebuilding is. Yet he does not do this. Instead, when he mentions activities that are erga, he only mentions activities that do not issue in products: e.g. seeing is the ergon of vision. And when he mentions products that are erga, he goes out of his way to say that the activities that issue in these products are not erga. He states: "a house is the ergon of the housebuilding-art and not the activity of housebuilding, and health is the ergon of the doctoring-art and not the activity of healing or doctoring" (1219a14-16, emphasis added).
Thus, Aristotle seems to be saying that when a thing's proper activity is for the sake of a product, the ergon of that thing is its product, not its proper activity.
we assume that the EE is a later work of Aristotle, there will be evidence that Aristotle subscribes to the alternative concept of an ergon both before and after the NE. 29 "Employment" translates χρῆσις. The employment is of the power (vision, the doctoring-art, the housebuilding-art, etc.), and I do not think that the word need imply that there must be a user that is distinct from the power. Notice also how the argument begins: "It is clear that the ergon is better than the state or disposition" (1219a11-13). It is only after making this claim that Aristotle draws the distinction between two types of erga: erga that are beyond activities and erga that are activities. With this distinction in hand, he concludes: "So it follows that, when a thing's employment is its ergon, the employment is better than the state" (1219a17-18).
Aristotle's reasoning proceeds like this: (1) The ergon is better than the state. (2) The ergon is an activity in some cases but a product in others. Therefore, (3) when the ergon is an activity, the activity is better than the state. The implication is that, when Aristotle made the claim about "the ergon" at the beginning of the passage ("the ergon is better than the state," 1219a12), he intended it to cover both sorts of erga, and thus was taking "ergon" to signify a single concept.
Where is the unity to be found? Helpfully, Aristotle says precisely where. Just before the quoted passage, he makes this claim about everything with an ergon: "the end of each <thing> is its ergon" (EE 1219a8), 31 explaining that "the end is best, as being an end" (EE 1219a10). 32 Then he indicates what he takes an "end" to be: "the end is the best in the sense of the last <thing> for the sake of which every thing else <is or is done>" (1219a10-11). 33 It is this idea that unifies the two ways in which ergon "is said" (1219a13). In the case of the housebuilding-art, the "last <thing> for the sake of which everything else <is done>" is a house (not housebuilding). However, in the case of the eye, Aristotle thinks, the "last <thing> for the sake of which everything else <is>" is seeing-and this is the activity itself.
Now if Aristotle had distinguished two senses of the word "ergon" we would expect him to give two corresponding accounts of what an ergon is, but he does not do this. He only gives this one account, and on this account, certain proper activities (e.g.
housebuilding and shoemaking) are not erga. We should also note, though we will discuss this more in the next section, that when Aristotle identifies the ergon of each thing as its end (EE 2. 1, 1219a8), he understands "end" in a certain way. The ergon of something is the end for the sake of which that sort of thing exists or "has being"-qua the sort of thing that it is. Thus, the ergon of the housebuilding-art will be a house 31 τέλος ἑκάστου τὸ ἔργον 32 τὸ γὰρ τέλος ἄριστον ὡς τέλος 33 τέλος τὸ βέλτιστον καὶ τὸ ἔσχατον, οὗ ἕνεκα τἆλλα πάντα.
because a house is the end for the sake of which the housebuilding-art, qua housebuilding-art, exists or has being. Notice that Aristotle in this passage does not indicate which meaning of the word "ergon"
he is using, and that is because (as I have argued) he has not distinguished different meanings of the word. He has instead indicated the different sorts of things that an ergon can be. Now notice how the passage is structured. Aristotle first articulates a principle (1219a19-20): the ergon of something and that of its virtue are the same (presumably in γένος, cf. NE 1. 7, 1098a8), though different (presumably because one is achieved well, cf. NE 1. 7, 1098a12). He then clarifies the principle by applying it to the case of the shoemaking-art: the ergon of the shoemaking-art is a shoe, while the ergon of its virtue is a good shoe (1219a20-23). He says this holds for other cases (1219a23), and then immediately applies it in the case of the soul: the ergon of the soul is living, and the 34 Since Aristotle identifies the ergon of the excellent soul as "good life" or "good living" (ζωὴ σπουδαία), we would expect him to identify the ergon of the soul as "life" or "living." It may then come as a surprise to read in different translations that the ergon of the soul is "to make things live" (M. Woods (trans. and comm.) Mass., 1996) , ad loc.), "to produce living" (J. Solomon (trans.), Eudemian Ethics in Barnes (ed.), Complete Works, vol. 2, 1922 -1981 , etc. The Greek is "τὸ ζῆν ποιεῖν." My solution is to understand "ποιέω" in the way that we argued Plato uses it in Republic I: the verb, while retaining the same meaning, can indicate a "doing" or a "making" as the case may be. Consequently, Aristotle at EE 2. 1, 1219a24 is not saying that the ergon of the soul is to make things live, but rather to "achieve" or "accomplish" living, which would be the same as "living" or "life." ergon of its virtue is good living (1219a23-27). The implication is that when Aristotle spoke of "the ergon" at the beginning of the passage ("let us say that a thing and its virtue have the same ergon but in different ways," 1219a19-20), he was assuming that the ergon of an X was in some cases an activity (e.g. the soul's living) but in other cases a product (e.g. the shoemaker's shoe) in accordance with the sort of thing the X is.
Why have scholars thought that Aristotle is here distinguishing different meanings of the word "ergon"? According to some translations, Aristotle actually says that ergon "has two meanings" or "has two senses" (λέγεται διχῶς, EE 2. 1, 1219a13). 35 However, because Aristotle has no word for "reference" as opposed to "meaning" or "sense," these translations are highly problematic. A much safer rendering of "λέγεται διχῶς" is "is said in two ways," 36 for the idea need only be "there can be two different things going on when we say <some word>." This allows for the possibility that Aristotle at EE 1219a13-17 is not making a distinction between two possible meanings but two possible referents-for "the ergon of an X" can refer to an activity or a product. As I have argued, the line of thought in the passage suggests that Aristotle at EE 2. 1, 1219a13 is using this "λέγεται διχῶς" in this latter way, and I should also add that Aristotle seems to use the phrase in this latter way just a few pages earlier at EE 1. 7, 1217a36, where he discusses the two ways in which πρακτόν ("achievable in action") "is said." Once we appreciate this, I believe we remove the last impediment that one might reasonably have to thinking that Aristotle in EE 2. 1 supposes the ergon of an X to be an activity in some cases but a product in others, depending on what the ergon is.
Now that we have outlined Aristotle's account, we are in a position to see how it addresses the difficulty present in Plato's accounts. As we saw, Plato did not obviously have the resources to pick out a house as opposed to housebuilding as the ergon of the housebuilding-art. This gap was due to Plato saying that the ergon of X was what X can achieve best, where the notion of "best" is with respect to a comparison class of things that can achieve similar erga (Rep. 1, . This allowed it to be possible that a housebuilder achieved a house best but also achieved housebuilding best. Aristotle closes this gap by giving an account of what an ergon is that employs the notion of "best" differently. He says that, if a thing has an ergon, "the ergon of each <thing> is its end" (EE 2. 1, 1219a8) and he clarifies this by saying "the end is the best in the sense of <being> the last <thing> for the sake of which everything else <is or is done>" (EE 2. 1, 1219a10-11). Here the notion of "best" is with respect to a comparison class of other things that an X, qua X, can achieve, and the way that one of these things is best is by being the last thing for the sake of which. This provides resources to pick out house as opposed to housebuilding as the ergon of the housebuilder because it is a house (and not housebuilding) that is the last thing for the sake of which a housebuilder, qua housebuilder, has being. There are also features of the text that suggest Aristotle is directly responding to Plato's account. Just after articulating his own account, Aristotle clarifies it by giving the very examples from Republic 1 (346d1-8)-the examples of the housebuilding-art and the doctoring-art-that Plato's account could not obviously accommodate and Aristotle pointedly remarks that that the ergon of the housebuilding-art is a house, "not housebuilding" (EE 2. 1, 1219a15), and that the ergon of the doctoringart is health, "not healing or doctoring" (EE 2. 1, 1219a15-16).
Aristotle's Understanding of an Ergon in the De Caelo
In the EE Aristotle seems to affirm that the ergon of something is the end for the sake of which that sort of thing exists or has being. This account also seems to be implicit in a line from Aristotle's natural philosophy, De Caelo 2. 3, 286a8-9: "Everything that has an ergon exists [or has being] for the sake of its ergon" (Ἕκαστόν ἐστιν, ὧν ἐστιν ἔργον, ἕνεκα τοῦ ἔργου)." If we pair this with the following passage from the Politics:
"The housebuilders' art exists [or has being] for the sake of a house" (ἔστι τῆς οἰκίας χάριν ἡ τῶν οἰκοδόµων τέχνη; Pol. 7. 8 1328a33), 37 we get the very claim we detected in EE 2. 1: the housebuilding-art exists for the sake of a house, which is its ergon.
38
37 Here Aristotle uses "χάριν" instead of "οὗ ἕνεκα," but this is of little importance. The context of the passage makes it clear that he considers the two expressions to be equivalent (cf. Pol. 7. 8, 1328a29). 38 Here I should note that Aquinas seems to arrive at an interpretation along these lines. This is despite the fact that the Latin translation he was using apparently rendered "ergon" in this passage as "operatio," which There are also reasons even within the De Caelo to think that Aristotle there is employing the concept of an ergon that we detected in the EE. Now it is uncontroversial that Aristotle sometimes identifies the ergon of an X as an activity. In fact, just after he articulates the principle mentioned above, he implicitly identifies the ergon of the heavenly bodies as a certain "eternal motion" (κίνησιν ἀΐδιον; 2. 3, 286a10). Aristotle is using the same concept of an ergon in both the passage from 2. 3, where he implicitly identifies the ergon of the heavenly bodies as an eternal motion (286a10), and in the passage from 3. 7, where he implies that the ergon of a productive art is its product (306a16). Consequently, he seems to be assuming that the ergon of an X may be an activity in some cases but a product in others, in accordance with the sort of thing the X is.
I also think that we can detect the alternative concept of an ergon in the very argument of De Caelo 2. 3. Aristotle's task in this chapter is to explain why there are different motions among the heavenly bodies, and he does so by employing the teleological principle "each thing with an ergon exists for the sake of its ergon" (2. 3, 286a8-9). He first shows that since the activity of what is divine is "eternal life" (ζωὴ ἀΐδιος, 286a9), the ergon of a divine (heavenly) body will be an eternal motion, which must be motion in a circle (286a10-12). This is the motion of the outer sphere, which carries the fixed stars. He then articulates a long chain of conditions necessary for this eternal motion, culminating in the claim that there must be an eternal process of terrestrial generation (286b1-2). In order that there should be this eternal process of generation, Aristotle thinks, there must be different, oblique motions in the heavens (286b2-4). These other motions belong to the inner spheres that contain the planets. The upshot is this. Because his explanation for the oblique motions of the inner spheres is that they exist for the sake of eternal terrestrial generation, it looks like the terrestrial generation will be the ergon of these motions. Consequently, it looks like the ergon of the outer sphere is its proper activity (namely, the eternal circular motion), while the ergon of the inner sphere containing planets is something beyond its proper activity (namely, the eternal process of terrestrial generation). When Aristotle identifies "the end" of the doctoring-art as health (NE 1. 1, 1094a8; EE 2. 1, 1219a14), he is thinking of a certain end, namely, the end that is "the last thing for the sake of which" the doctoring-art, qua doctoring-art, exists or has being.
When Aristotle identifies-in the EE and elsewhere 42 -the ergon of an X as "the end of an X" he has this sort of end in mind. To clarify further Aristotle's thought, we will consider three questions that one might have at this point. 41 Here the language of "product" to describe the ergon beyond the proper activity of something may be misleading. For, of course, in the case I have just described, the ergon beyond the proper activity is still an activity (the eternal process of terrestrial generation). The point, though, is just that the proper activity of the inner spheres is not the end, but rather something beyond it. The reason this process of generation can be an end (even though it is a process) is because it is eternal and so is in a way something complete (cf. NE X 4, 1174a19-21). 42 Besides the passages we have already discussed, consider: "The ergon is the end" (Meta. Θ 8, 1150a21), "That for the sake of which <a house exists> is <its> ergon…" (Meta. B 2, 996b7), and "if each body had the ability to progress but not to perceive, it would perish and would not reach its end, which is the ergon of its nature" (DA 3. 12, 434a32-b1). 195b21-24) . The housebuilding-art is that in virtue of which a housebuilder builds a house. And so if we identify the ergon of the housebuilding-art as a house, we have thereby also identified the ergon of the housebuilder, qua housebuilder. "The ergon of the housebuilding-art" is more exact locution, and so is Aristotle's preferred expression. Yet because such exactness is not always needed, he also speaks of "the ergon of the housebuilder."
First, while in the Protrepticus
Second, because "the ergon of each thing is its end" (EE 2. 1, 1219a8) and the human good is the end of all things achievable in action (cf. NE 1. 2, 1094a18-22), does it follow that the human good is somehow the ergon of every achievable thing, including every art (the doctoring-art, the housebuilding-art, etc.)? It does not. Something can have more than one end, and the end that is the ergon is not the same as the end that is the human good. As we have seen, Aristotle's examples from EE 2. 1 indicate that the ergon of something is the end for the sake of which that kind of thing exists. Thus, in the case of the end that is the ergon, Aristotle circumscribes the "for the sake of" relation to the thing in question-qua that kind of thing. For example, though the bridle-making-art exists for the sake of a bridle, and a bridle exists for the sake of the activity of horse riding, it does not follow that the ergon of a bridle-maker is the activity of horse riding. (Horse riding would be the ergon of the horse rider, who uses the bridle.) Rather, the "last <thing> for the sake of which" the bridle-maker does what he does, qua bridle-maker, is a bridle (cf. stop, and this is the end it is aimed at-a house. 45 The fact that Aristotle gives principled reasons for marking a distinction between these different kinds of proper activities shows that he also has principled reasons for thinking that housebuilding cannot be the end for the sake of which the housebuilding-art, qua housebuilding-art, exists. This in turn gives him reason for identifying the ergon of the housebuilding-art as a house and not housebuilding. For when X's proper activity is incomplete, X's ergon will be something 43 To see this more clearly, it may be helpful to ask and answer a few questions. What is the end for the sake of which the housebuilding-art, qua thing achievable in action, exists? The human good. And what is the end for the sake of which the doctoring-art, qua thing achievable in action, exists? Also, the human good. But what is the end for the sake of which the housebuilding-art, qua housebuilding-art, exists? The ergon of the housebuilding-art: a house. And what is the end for the sake of which the doctoring-art, qua doctoring-art, exists? The ergon of the doctoring-art: health. The addition of such 'qua'-locutions is helpful because, though Aristotle clearly subscribes to these distinctions, he is often content just to speak of "the end of an X" and let the context do the work of directing the reader's attention to the one or the other of these two ends. 44 τῶν περὶ τὸ τέλος (Meta. Θ 6, 1048b18 further, typically a product, and when X's proper activity is complete, X's ergon will be its proper activity.
Aristotle's Understanding of an Ergon in the NE
We have so far seen that both Plato in the Republic and Aristotle in the Protrepticus, Eudemian Ethics and De Caelo appear to think that the ergon of an X is not always an activity, but instead an activity in some cases but a product in others, in accordance with the sort of thing the X is. Consequently, if in the NE ergon argument Aristotle were to assume that the ergon of an X is always a proper activity, he would be breaking with a precedent and this would call for explanation. However, as we will now see, there are good reasons for thinking that Aristotle in the NE still subscribes to his earlier understanding of an ergon.
Before we focus on the ergon argument itself, we should note a few considerations that suggest the alterative concept of an ergon is in use in the NE. First, whenever Aristotle in the NE clearly identifies the ergon of a productive art (the shoemaking-art, the housebuilding-art, etc.), he identifies it not as the art's proper activity (shoemaking, housebuilding, etc.), but as its product (a shoe, a house, etc.). 46 Second, in the De Caelo (2. 3, 286a8-9 and 3. 7, 306a14-16), the EE (2. 1, 1219a8) and elsewhere, Aristotle maintained that the ergon of X was "the end of an X," or more specifically, the end for the sake of which an X, qua X, has being. If Aristotle in the NE still subscribes to this account of what an ergon is (and I see no reason to think he does not), then NE 1. 1
gives us good reason to think that Aristotle is employing the alternative concept of an ergon. For one thing, Aristotle clearly identifies the ends of certain arts as products:
"Since there are many actions, arts and sciences, there turns out to be many ends: health is the end of the doctoring-art, a boat of the boatbuilding-art, victory of generalship, and wealth of household-management" (1094a6-9). 47 But Aristotle also, just before these lines, explicitly states that the end of an X is an activity in some cases but a product in others, depending on what X is. The distinction is given pride of place: it occurs at the very beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics:
Every craft and every inquiry, and likewise every action and decision are thought to aim at some good. And so the good has been aptly dubbed: that for which all things aim. In the first two sentences of this passage, Aristotle identifies the good of something with the end of that thing. He then draws a distinction among ends, noting that some are activities, while some are certain erga beyond the activities. With this distinction drawn, he notes that, in those cases where the erga are beyond the activities, the erga are better than the activities.
I should also note that, though nearly every translation renders "erga" at 1094a5-6 as "products" (or some equivalent), it is not obvious that the word here means this.
Instead, I think Aristotle uses the phrase "certain erga beyond the activities" (1094a4-5)
to refer to products. He does so by the addition of "beyond the activities," which would be somewhat redundant if "ergon" meant "product" and which possibly signals that there are other erga that are not beyond the activities (i.e. because they are the activities).
Aristotle's use of the indefinite article τινά ("certain" or "some") also suggests this, and I think we should be discomfited by the fact that the word is often downplayed and sometimes left untranslated. Irwin, for example, drops the τινά, translating the line:
"others are products apart from the activities" (1094a4-5). A reason for this is not hard to find. If one translates "erga" as "products," and yet also translates the τινά, the line seems off: "Yet there seems to be a difference among ends: some are activities, and others are certain products beyond the activities" (1094a3-5). One naturally wonders: why just certain products? Why not all products? When there is a product beyond the activity isn't it always the end?
Of course, one might think that Aristotle is trying to allow for the possibility of by-products (like the scraps a shoemaker makes while producing a shoe). But several factors make this unlikely. 48 One might also think that τινά does not have much content so that it does not even warrant being translated. But this seems unlikely if for no other reason than because Aristotle explains how he understands "παρ' αὐτὰς ἔργα τινά"
("certain erga beyond the activities," 1094a4-5) by immediately glossing it as "τέλη τινὰ παρὰ τὰς πράξεις" ("certain ends beyond the actions," 1094a5). Because the phrase τέλη τινὰ clearly means "certain ends" it makes sense to take ἔργα τινά as "certain erga"
Now if we suppose Aristotle to be using the alternative concept of an ergon, the τινά makes good sense: since erga can designate activities or products, Aristotle uses the word τινά to indicate only those "certain" erga that are beyond activities, namely products. 49 I should also add that if "erga" here really does mean "products" the last sentence is surprisingly wordy. Surely Aristotle would have only needed to say:
"products are by nature better than the activities that produce them." Instead, Aristotle 48 First, it is not at all obvious that Aristotle would use the word "ergon" to refer to a by-product, and I know of no occasion on which he does so. Second, if this were Aristotle's reasoning, we would expect him to add a similar qualification to ἐνέργειαι ("activities") at 1094a4, but he does not. The reason we should expect this is because Aristotle would similarly think that even when the end of a thing is an activity, there may still be other activities (besides the end) that the thing does, qua that sort of thing (like the stretching of a dancer before dancing, or the playing of scales by a musician). Third, as I note in the main text, Aristotle seems to explain what he means by "παρ' αὐτὰς ἔργα τινά" ("certain erga beyond the activities," 1094a4-5) by immediately glossing it as "τέλη τινὰ παρὰ τὰς πράξεις" ("certain ends beyond the actions," 1094a5). The τινά in the latter phrase is clearly supposed to signal that there are other ends that are not beyond the actions, but rather are the actions (as Aristotle has just explained, 1094a3-5). If the two phrases are expressing the same basic idea (as they seem to), then the τινά in the former phrase would naturally signal that there are other erga that are not beyond the activities, but rather are the activities. 49 I should perhaps add that even though I take the phrase ἔργα τινά at 1095a5 to refer to products, that is not a good reason to translate the phrase as "products." This is because ἔργα τινά does not mean "products," and we should be trying to translate what these words mean and not what they refer to.
seems to convey by means of the phrase "in these cases" (ἐν τούτοις) that there are other cases in which the erga are not better than the activities; again, this is because the erga, in those cases, are the activities. This is the only use of the word "ergon" before the ergon argument, and by using it here, he directs his reader to think of erga as ends (just as he does in the EE), and to think of certain (τινά) of these erga as products, namely those that are "beyond activities."
But even apart from the remarks on translation that I have just made, these first lines of the NE (as rendered in almost any contemporary translation) give us reason to think that Aristotle in the ergon argument is not speaking of a function by means of the word "ergon." 50 Consider Section A once again. After reminding us that people agree in calling the best good achievable in action eudaimonia, Aristotle says we still need clarity on what this best good is. He suggests that we will attain this if we grasp the ergon of a human, and he offers an explanation for this suggestion:
This is because just as in the case of a flautist, a sculptor, and every artisan, and generally, in the case of whatever has an ergon and an action, the good, that is, 51 the well [τὸ εὖ] seems to be <found> in its ergon, the same would seem to be true for a human, if he has an ergon. (NE 1. 7, 1097b24-28) Scholars of course assume that Aristotle is here claiming that for anything with an ergon and an action, "the good, that is, the well" is found in that thing's proper activity. But there is a serious problem with this assumption. As we just noted, Aristotle offers the ergon argument as an attempt to determine the best good achievable in action (1097b22; cf. 1. 2, 1094a18-22 and 1. 4, 1095a16-17). And so when Aristotle says that for anything with an ergon and an action "the good, that is, the well" is found in its ergon (1097b27), 50 That is, even if one thought that "erga" in the first lines of NE 1. 1 meant "products," the principle expressed in these first lines gives us good reason to think it is the alternative concept (as found in Rep. 1, EE 2. 1, etc.) that must be present in NE 1. 7. 51 I take the καὶ in τἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ τὸ εὖ epexegetically, and recommend that we translate it either as "that is" or "in the sense of." This interpretation is commonly assumed by translators and commentators alike. I should also note that at the beginning of NE 1. 2, Aristotle designates a sense of "the good" by using καὶ in just this way. He writes: "If there is an end of things achievable in action, which we desire on account of itself, and other things on account of this, and we do not choose all things for the sake of something else… clearly this would be the good, that is, the best <good> [τἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον]" (1094a18-22).
he must be assuming there is not another sort of thing that such an agent can achieve that is better than the ergon. However, the first lines of the NE plainly state that when the end is beyond the activity, the ergon is by nature better than the activity. That is, in the case of things that yield products, the products are better sorts of things than the activities that produce them. Thus, the best sort of thing that a sculptor can achieve is not sculpting, but a sculpture. And so if Aristotle is going to locate "the good, that is, the well" anywhere it will need to be in the best sort of thing that an X, qua X, can achieve. The thought of Section A, then, will need to be something like this: Just as the best achievement of a sculptor is found in his ergon (his sculpture), and that of a flute-player in his ergon (his performance), so the best achievement of a human will be found in his ergon, if he has one. Consequently, Aristotle is assuming that while the ergon of a flautist is an activity (his performance), the ergon of a sculptor is not an activity but a product (his sculpture).
In case anyone might consider this an outlandish suggestion, I now note that the alternative concept of an ergon seems to be presupposed in both of the two ancient commentaries on the NE that discuss the ergon argument. One of these is the earliest extant commentary on the NE (in fact, the earliest extant commentary on any of Later he identifies the human ergon as an activity, and in particular, a rational activity (18. 1-2). Thus, Aspasius seems to think that the ergon of an X may be a product in some cases (e.g. the shoe of a shoemaker) but an activity in others (e.g. the rational activity of a human) in accordance with the sort of thing the X is. The anonymous author of the ancient Greek paraphrase of the NE thinks the same. Here is how he rewords Section A:
For just as the good of every artisan is found in his ergon [ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ αὐτοῦ], the good of a fluteplayer in his performance [ἐν τῷ αὐλεῖν] and the good of a sculptor in the sculpture [ἐν τῷ ἀγάλµατι] (and this generally holds for every ergon and action), so the human good is in the human ergon, if there is some ergon of a human, insofar as he is a human. (13. 22-26) 53 The idea seems to be that while the ergon of the flute-player is an activity (his performance, τὸ αὐλεῖν), the ergon of a sculptor is not an activity but a product (the sculpture, τὸ ἄγαλµα). And so both Aspasius and the paraphraser-the only extant ancient commentators on the NE ergon argument-assume that Aristotle there employs the alternative concept of an ergon.
My arguments have so far primarily focused on the concept of an ergon used in the Section A, but I now note that whatever concept of an ergon is used in Section A must be used throughout the ergon argument. Section A makes a claim about whatever has an ergon and an action; and the whole point is that, while this claim clearly holds for every artisan (1097b26), it will also hold true for a human, if he has an ergon. When
Aristotle goes on to identify the human ergon is "activity on the basis of reason or not without reason" (1098a7), the concept must stay the same. If this is so, and if I am right about what an ergon is, then it is an error to suppose that "ergon" in NE 1. 7 means "function" or "proper activity." The ergon argument is not a "function" argument. 
The Translation of "Ergon"
How, then, should we translate "ergon"? Any translation must at least be capable of applying either to an activity or to a product that issues from an activity. "Proper activity" or "characteristic activity" obviously cannot cover the latter case. If "function"
53 Heliodori in ethica Nicomachea paraphrasis, in G. Heylbut (ed.), Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, 19.2 (Berlin, 1889), 1-233, ad loc. 54 One might consider it a mark against my interpretation that Aristotle just seems to assume that the ergon of a human is an activity. For if Aristotle is employing the standard concept of an ergon, on which every ergon is an activity, such an assumption would of course make sense. But if Aristotle is employing the alternative concept of an ergon, shouldn't he seriously entertain the possibility that the ergon of a human is a product? I do not think so. Aristotle is employing a concept that he shares with Plato, who also assumes that while the ergon of the housebuilder is a product (346d3-4), the ergon of a human is an activity (353d5), and so we need not think that Aristotle would always need to determine afresh whether the ergon of an X is an activity or a product. Also, as we will discuss, the key reason why Aristotle needs to be employing the alternative concept is because this is the only way that Section A can be relevant to determining the best achievement of a human, and such a reason does not require that Aristotle seriously entertain the possibility that the human ergon is a product.
is capable of doing so, I believe that is only due to an etymological branch of the word that is in important respects unrelated to the branch according to which it means "proper activity." With regard to the latter ("proper activity") branch, Barney correctly employs the word when she writes: "shoemaking is a function." 55 One translation that has the right semantic range is "work" or perhaps "proper work." The Oxford English Dictionary divides the meanings of "work" into two: as a kind of doing (I. 1-8) or as something made (II. 9-21). We can speak of a "work of art" (say, a statue) but also the "proper work" of a dancer (dancing). 56 Consequently, if we wish to articulate the pre-theoretical concept of an "ergon of an X" that Plato and Aristotle seem to share, it may help to think of it as the "work of an X." First, if Aristotle is using the alternative concept of an ergon, then when he identifies the ergon of the kitharist as the performance on the kithara (1. 7, 1098a10-11), he is doing so precisely because this is the end of the kitharist, qua kitharist. Aristotle must, then, think that the proper activity of the kitharist is a complete activity, issuing in no distinct product. Difficulty arises, though, when we observe certain passages in which Aristotle appears to assume that the proper activity of every art (τέχνη) is an incomplete activity, issuing in a distinct product. Notably, in NE 6 (=EE 5). 4 (cf. NE 2. 4) he says that producing (ποίησις) and action (πρᾶξις) are different (1140a2), and he seems to be assuming that action (πρᾶξις) is a kind of complete activity and producing (ποίησις) is a kind of incomplete activity. 58 Art (τέχνη), he further asserts, is a state of true reason concerned with producing (1140a20-21), not action. Thus, he appears to assume that the proper activity of every art is an incomplete activity. 59 Given that the skill of the kitharist seems to be a relatively straightforward counterexample to this claim, there seem to be three interpretive options. First, it did not occur to Aristotle that someone might consider the skill of the kitharist (or the flute-player, etc.) to be a counterexample. Second, Aristotle thinks that the activity of the kitharist is an incomplete activity, issuing in a distinct product. Or third, Aristotle in NE 6. 4 is employing the term "art" ("τέχνη") in a restricted sense such that the skill of the kitharist is not an art but an expertise concerned with action.
I will argue in favor of the third option. Against the first option, we should note (1197a5-10; cf. 2. 12, 1211b25-32) 58 Aristotle here relies on his lost "popular discussions" (1140a3) and so we cannot be sure of his reasoning. 59 Because I have made use of the EE and the NE in my overall argument, NE 6 (=EE 5). 4 is relevant to discuss no matter whether I maintain that its proper home is the NE or the EE.
Here Aristotle (or some Aristotelian 60 ) clearly asserts that while there is an end beyond housebuilding, there is not an end beyond the performance of the kitharist. 61 And so there is reason to think that, according to Aristotle, the performance of the kitharist is not an incomplete activity and so not an instance of production. (Also, if the author of the MM thinks that the ergon of an X is the end of an X, qua X, then he would naturally employ the alterative concept of an ergon.) In support of the third option, we should note that the author of the MM passage uses the word "art" in a restricted sense such that the skill of the kitharist is not an art but an expertise concerned with action. This is clear because the author states both that the activity of the kitharist is not an instance of production but an instance of action, and that "art" is concerned with production and not action. Thus, it seems not unlikely that Aristotle is using the word "art" in a similarly restricted sense in NE 6. 4. , Reason and Emotion (Princeton, 1999), 195-211. 61 The Stoics also acknowledged that some arts (e.g. the arts of dancing and acting) for which the proper activity is the end (cf. De Finibus 3. 24) . See G. Striker, "Antipater, Or the Art of Living", in M. Schofield and G. Striker (eds.), Norms of Nature (Cambridge, 2007), 185-204. 62 I believe what I have said above is enough to give us reason to think that in NE 1. 7 Aristotle supposes the kitharist, qua kitharist, to have no further end beyond his proper activity. Nevertheless, in NE 1. 7 Aristotle appears to consider the skill of the flute-player to be an art (τέχνη) (1097b25-27). How do we reconcile this with NE 6. 4? I think we must suppose that, while in NE 6. 4 Aristotle uses the word "art" in the restricted sense on which only productive expertises count as arts, in NE 1. 7 he uses "art" in a broader sense on which non-productive practical expertises can count as arts. Independent confirmation that Aristotle in NE 1. 7 uses the word in this broader way comes from combining two observations. First, the restricted sense of "art" corresponds to a restricted sense of "action" (πρᾶξις) on which an incomplete activity such as housebuilding is not an action but a producing (ποίησις). Second, NE 1. 7 implies that a sculptor and indeed every artisan has an action (1097b25-27). Consequently, since Aristotle in NE 1. 7 uses "action" not in the restricted but in the broad sense, it makes sense that we would be using "art" in the broad sense as well. 63 For example, M. Nussbaum, "Aristotle on Human Nature and the Foundations of Ethics", in J. E. J. Altham and R. Harrison (eds.), World, Mind, and Ethics (Cambridge, 1995) , 86-132 at 112 translates ἔργον τι καὶ πρᾶξις (1097b26) as "function or activity" and writes, "What would naturally be meant by the 'function or activity' of a certain sort of craftsman would be that craftsman's characteristic activity qua that sort of craftsman-the activity or activities in virtue of which he is, and is counted as, a craftsman of that sort."
reading, 64 and if one accepts my arguments about what an ergon is, one should go for the former reading instead. If after adopting the former reading one should then wonder why Aristotle speaks here (and at 1097b29) of "action," I suggest the following explanation.
65
Aristotle makes it very clear that he is looking for the best thing achievable by humans in action (πρακτὸν ἀνθρώπῳ), where "action" seems to be an activity that partakes in reason to some extent. And so it is likely that Aristotle makes the claim of Section A only about those things that can achieve things in action-that is, only about those things have both an ergon and an action (1097b26), where "action" is not just a thing's proper activity but the sort of proper activity that partakes in reason. The principle of Section A, then, is
probably not here applied to just anything with an ergon, including artifacts. [Section A] … Just as for a flautist, a sculptor, and every artisan, and generally, for whatever has an ergon and an action, the good, that is, the well [τὸ εὖ] seems to be <found> in its ergon, the same would seem to be so for a human, if he has an ergon. (NE 1. 7, 1097b25-28) Though I cannot here fully justify my doing so, I take the claim of Section A to be this:
64 For example, if we take καὶ epexegetically both at NE 1. 7, 1097b26 and 1097b29, it seems like the phrases would propose incompatible extensions for an ergon. The first (ἔργον τι καὶ πρᾶξις rendered as "an ergon, i.e. an action") will have it that every ergon is an action, while the second (ἔργα τινὰ καὶ πράξεις rendered as "certain erga, i.e. actions") will have it that only certain erga are actions (with the implication being that some erga are not actions). Also, neither Aspasius nor the ancient paraphraser takes the καί at 1097b26 this way. 65 Besides the explanation that I offer in the main text, I should also add that the καί may be quasiepexegetic such that the phrase should be understood as "including action." (The same explanation could hold for "καὶ πράξεις" at 1097b29.) The rationale for this would be that Aristotle wants to make clear that an ergon can be an action, and he might think such clarification helpful because he earlier (at NE 1.1, 1094a5) used the word "erga" to refer to products. 66 Pace, for example, G. Lawrence, "Fallacious?", 206: "the principle <in Section A> is being generalized over all functional items, including artifacts." I do not mean to deny that Aristotle sometimes uses the word "πρᾶξις" to mean something like "proper activity," but I do not think he does so in NE 1. 7. Instead I think that the use in NE 1. 7 is more similar to the one we find at NE 6 (=EE 5). 2, 1139a19-20: "it is clear that wild animals [θηρία] have perception but no share in action [πράξεως] ."
[Claim of Section A] For anything with an ergon and an action, the good in the sense of the excellent achievement (τἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ εὖ) is found in its ergon.
Like many others, I take τὸ εὖ of an X to be the ergon of an X achieved well (cf. NE 1. 7, 1098a12; 2. 6, 1106b12). But, of course, unlike many others, I do not think an ergon is always an activity. Consequently, I think that the alternative concept of an ergon should lead us to understand τὸ εὖ as meaning something like "the excellent accomplishment" or "the excellent achievement," where this can be either an excellent activity or an excellent product. 67 I also think the excellent achievement is found in the ergon in the way that a species is found in a genus (cf. Physics 6. 3, 210a18). 68 And so one could also understand the claim of Section A to be: For anything that has an ergon and an action, the good in the sense of the excellent achievement is its ergon achieved well. Section A, then, locates the right class or genus within which to find the human good, that is, the best thing achievable by a human. Aristotle reasons that just as a sculptor's excellent achievement will be in his ergon (which is a sculpture, not sculpting), so will his best achievement.
And just as a human's excellent achievement will be in his ergon (which is activity of the part of the soul having reason), so will his best achievement-that is, the human good.
This puts us in a position to reconstruct the ergon argument in such a way that it is both valid and plausible. Below I list the premises and conclusions of the ergon argument roughly in the order in which they are found or implicitly found in the text, omitting some sub-arguments (the arguments that a human has an ergon, and the argument that the human ergon is an activity of the rational part of the soul) as well as some clarifications (e.g. Aristotle's explication of "rational part of the soul"). After each 67 I am here offering an alternative to the common way of interpreting "τὸ εὖ" as "the doing well." My interpretation lines up nicely with the way Aristotle uses "τὸ εὖ" and "τὸ εὖ ἔχον ἔργον" in NE 2. 6, 1106b8-14, a passage that recalls the ergon argument of NE 1. 7 by developing the connection between virtue and 'the excellent ergon' that was first introduced there. 68 This interpretation of "is in" falls between the two interpretations currently available in the secondary literature. Some scholars think that when Aristotle says the well "is in" the ergon, he means that the well "consists in" or "is" the ergon (cf. R. Kraut, Aristotle on the Human Good (Princeton, 1989), 312). Others think that he means that the well "depends on" the human ergon (cf. Irwin, Ethics, 183.) Though I cannot argue for this here, I take the latter claim to be too weak to allow Aristotle to arrive at his definition, and I take the former claim to be one that Aristotle considers false.
premise I indicate in parentheses the sections of the text to which the premise corresponds.
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P1:
The human good is the best achievement of a human (1097b22-23; cf. NE 1. 1-2).
P2:
The best achievement of a human is the excellent achievement of a human with any bettermaking features that there may be.
[assumption] C1: The human good is the excellent achievement of a human with any better-making features that there may be.
[from P1 and P2] P3: For anything that has an ergon and an action, the excellent achievement of that thing is its ergon excellently achieved (1097b25-28 [=claim of Section A]). P4: A human being has an ergon and an action. [From sub-argument in 1097b28-33] C2: Therefore, the excellent achievement of a human being is the human ergon excellently achieved.
[from P3 and P4] P5: The ergon of a human being is activity of the part of the human soul having reason (1098a7-8).
[From sub-argument in 1097b33-1098a4] C3: Therefore, the excellent achievement of a human being is activity of the part of the soul having reason, achieved excellently. [from C2 and P5] P6: For an ergon to be achieved excellently is for it to be achieved on the basis of virtue/excellence (1098a15; cf. 1098a8-11). C4: Therefore, the excellent achievement of a human being is activity on the basis of the virtue of the part of the human soul having reason (1098a16-17 Recall that before the ergon argument Aristotle makes it abundantly clear that for something to be the human good is for it to be the best thing achievable by humans in action (cf. 1. 2, 1094a18-22; I 4, 1095a16-17). Aristotle characterizes the nature of the human good in no other way than this. 73 Consequently, because the conclusion of the ergon argument is a definition of the human good, the key explanatory middle term of the argument ought to be "the best achievement of a human." However, no current interpretation supposes this to be the middle term. The reason, I believe, is as follows.
Since scholars have assumed that Aristotle's concept of an ergon is the concept of a proper activity, they have been unable to interpret Section A in such a way that it is relevant to determining the best achievement of a human. They have heard Aristotle as saying that for a sculptor, flautist and every artisan, "the good, that is, the well" is found 71 The other feature of central importance is that on my reconstruction Aristotle distinguishes the excellent achievement of a human from the best achievement. The excellent achievement of a human is "activity of the soul on the basis of virtue," and when Aristotle adds the two criteria "if there are more virtues than one, on the basis of the best and most end-like virtue" and "in a end-like [i.e. complete] life" he is listing further requirements that something must meet if it is to be the best achievement of a human, which is the human good (and not merely the excellent achievement). Current reconstructions suppose that the proper conclusion of the argument is "activity of the soul on the basis of virtue" (what I take to be the excellent achievement of a human) and that the two criteria are merely optional elucidations of that conclusion. See the reconstructions listed in the previous footnote as well as the influential (though brief) statement of this "implicit criteria view" by J. Ackrill, "Aristotle on Eudaimonia", in A. Rorty (ed.), Essays on Aristotle's Ethics (Berkeley, 1980) , 15-34 at 27. I should add that, though I do not agree with the implicit criteria view, my interpretation of Section A can be made compatible with it so long as one identifies the best accomplishment of a human with the excellent accomplishment of a human. 72 What is an "explanatory middle term"? In an Aristotelian syllogism there are three terms, and the middle term is the one the drops out in the conclusion. Consider: "Shelters for belongings are roofed. Barns are shelters for belongings. Therefore, barns are roofed." (See J. Barnes (trans. and comm.) , Aristotle: Posterior Analytics (Oxford, 1993), 231.) The middle term is "shelters for belongings." Here the middle term is also explanatory because it is in virtue of being a "shelter for belongings" that a barn is roofed. Above I speak of the key explanatory middle term, and that is because, even though there are several middle terms in the argument, "the best achievement of a human" (as used in the argument from P1 and P2 to C1) is the one that provides the direct link to "the human good." 73 Indeed, even though Aristotle says, "eudaimonia most of all seems to be this sort of thing [i.e. the best and most end-like good]" (NE 1. 7, 1097a34), he never says that for something to be the human good is for it to be eudaimonia. Though I cannot argue for this here, I think there is good reason to believe that the human good and eudaimonia are not coextensive. God, for example, is the primary instance of eudaimonia but does not possess the human good since this is the best thing achievable by humans in action.
in their respective proper activities. Because the best achievement of a sculptor is clearly not found in his activity of sculpting but in his sculpture (or sculptures), scholars have had to come up with a different key middle term for the ergon argument. They have proposed "the virtue of a human," 74 "the flourishing of an human," 75 "the successful functioning of an human," 76 etc. Barney, for example, supposes both that the human good is the flourishing of a human, and that the claim of Section A is: for anything with an ergon and an action, the flourishing of that thing is its ergon accomplished well. 77 Barney's interpretation might initially seem attractive. However, when we bear in mind that, according to Aristotle, for something to be the human good is for it to be the best good achievable by humans in action, we see that Barney's proposal (as well as any other that does not employ the alternative concept of an ergon) is unacceptable. When Aristotle arrives at his definition of the human good, he must do so not because this is the flourishing of a human or because this is the successful functioning of a human, but rather because this is the best achievement of a human.
To appreciate this point, consider the following requirement for any (charitable) interpretation of the ergon argument: it must ensure that if the human good is an activity, it is a complete activity. This is because an incomplete activity is essentially for the sake of something else, and the human good, in virtue of being the human good, is an end that is not such as to be chosen for the sake of something else. Thus, because the ergon argument is offered as the explanation for why the human good is defined as it is, the argument should ensure that if the human good is an activity, it is a complete activity.
However, only my interpretation of the argument does this. I think that Aristotle employs the alternative concept of an ergon (on which, if the ergon is an activity, it must be a complete activity), and that Aristotle supposes that for any X with an ergon and an action, the best achievement of an X is a certain excellent version of its ergon. Contrast this with, for example, Barney's interpretation. She thinks that Aristotle employs the standard concept of an ergon and that Aristotle supposes that for any X with an ergon and an action, the flourishing of an X is its functioning well. Thus it could turn out that the flourishing of an X is an incomplete activity: e.g. the flourishing of a sculptor is sculpting well. Though the "flourishing of a human" turns out to be a complete activity, that is just a coincidence. On Barney's interpretation, nothing about Aristotle's reasoning requires it to be a complete activity. Consequently, I contend that we need to assume that Aristotle is employing the alternative concept of an ergon if he is to be plausibly interpreted as giving the right sort of explanation for defining the human good as he does.
Why is grasping the correct explanation so important? Aristotle quite generally maintains that one understands (ἐπίστασθαι) that something is the case only when one grasps the explanation for why it is the case. 78 He would, then, appear to maintain that one understands his definition of the human good only when one grasps the explanation for why the human good is defined as it is. I have argued that we can grasp this explanation-that is, the ergon argument-only if we suppose Aristotle to be employing the alternative concept of an ergon.
Conclusion
In this paper I have attempted to clear the way for a new interpretation of Aristotle's famous ergon argument of NE 1. 7. In doing so I have argued for several theses: (1) the ergon of an X is an activity in some cases but a product in others, in accordance with the sort of thing the X is, (2) Plato and Aristotle share this basic concept of an ergon, but differ in their accounts of what an ergon is, (3) Aristotle's account of an ergon is "the end for the sake of which an X, qua X, exists," and (4) the alternative concept of an ergon allows the key explanatory middle term of the argument to be what it in fact ought to be: "the best achievement of a human." A full explication and evaluation 78 See APo 1. 2, 71b30-31 (cf. Meta. A 1, 981b8-9 and Ph. 1. 1, 184a1-16). In NE 6. 3 Aristotle says that one can have epistēmē ("expert knowledge" or "understanding"), strictly speaking, only about things that do not admit of change-that is, only in theoretical matters. However, in the same passage Aristotle implicitly acknowledges that there are states that resemble knowledge in the strict sense (NE 6. 3, 1139b18-19) , and Aristotle applies the word epistēmē both to practical and productive expertises at various places in the NE (e.g. 1. 2, 1094b2-7; 7. 3, 1147b13-17) and in the Metaphysics (e.g. A 1, 981b8-9; E 2, 1026b4-5). Thus, it is defensible to suppose that, according to Aristotle, one can have understanding (or something like understanding) of ethical truths and that such understanding would require grasping the explanation for why that truth held.
